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HOW SHELL ENTITIES AND LACK OF 
OWNERSHIP TRANSPARENCY  
FACILITATE TAX EVASION AND MODERN 
POLICY RESPONSES TO THESE PROBLEMS 
CARL PACINI* & NATE WADLINGER** 
The purpose of this article is to review the use and application of shell 
entities, as they facilitate tax evasion, impede investigations, and harm society.  
This article details the types and characteristics of shell entities, reviews actual 
cases to exhibit how shells are abused, outlines reasons shells disguise 
beneficial ownership, and analyzes steps taken by countries and organizations 
to thwart the abuse of shell entities.  Many types of shell entities are used by 
tax evaders and are often layered in an intricate network which conceals the 
identity of beneficial owners.  Nominees and bearer shares are used in tandem 
with shell entities to optimize concealment.  Accountants, lawyers, and trust 
and company service providers facilitate and promote the use and abuse of 
shell entities by tax fraudsters.  The analysis makes clear the reasons for and 
means by which tax evaders conceal trillions of dollars of income and wealth 
that remain untaxed and may be used for nefarious purposes.  The findings 
demonstrate that shell entities used to conceal income and wealth prevent 
untold trillions in taxes from being collected by governments worldwide.  This 
lack of revenue facilitates income inequality and skews national economic and 
fiscal policies.  The G-8, Financial Action Task Force, and G-20 have begun 
steps to improve ownership transparency, but the effort is moving at a modest 
pace.  There is a need for more concerted action by national governments, 
organizations, the United Nations, and law enforcement to improve ownership 
transparency and information exchange regarding shell entities. 
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So many wealthy Americans and persons from other countries evade taxes 
using offshore and onshore accounts that law enforcement cannot control the 
growing misconduct.1  The IRS estimates that tax evasion costs the federal 
government on average $458 billion per year in lost revenues.2  Tax cheats 
evade taxes and hide illegally obtained assets and illicit activities by availing 
themselves of the secrecy provided by legal domestic and offshore business 
??????????? ????????? ????????? ??? ??? ??????????????????  In 2011, a World Bank 
Study found that 70% of 213 large-scale corruption cases relied on the secrecy 
of shell entities to hide the identity of the beneficial owners.3  The legal 
structures of such entities typically include domestic and offshore limited 
liability companies (LLCs), limited liability partnerships (LLPs), international 
1. David Cay Johnston, Tax Cheats Called Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at C1. 
2. Chris Matthews, Here’s How Much Tax Cheats Cost the U.S. Government a Year, FORTUNE
(Apr. 29, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/29/tax-evasion-cost/ [https://perma.cc/XXX4-TCYX]. 
3. GLOBAL WITNESS, POVERTY, CORRUPTION AND ANONYMOUS COMPANIES: HOW HIDDEN 
COMPANY OWNERSHIP FUELS CORRUPTION AND HINDERS THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY 2 (Mar. 
2014),  http://www.globalwitness.org/library/anonymous-companies-global-witness-briefing 
[https://perma.cc/2B5V-J6AR]. 
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business companies (IBCs), private foundations, company foundations, and 
asset protection trusts.  Regardless of the entity type, the identities of the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????4
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) defines a beneficial ??????????????
natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the natural 
person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted??5  This definition is 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ???exercise ultimate effective 
????????????????????????????????????????????6  A beneficial owner is always a 
natural person; a legal person cannot be a beneficial owner.7  Ultimate control 
is by a natural person to allow that individual to benefit from the asset 
involved.8
Obscured beneficial ownership via shell entities impedes law enforcement 
and forensic accountants in tracking the movements of money and investigating 
and recovering stolen assets and untaxed income.9  This is true for a wide range 
of investigations that relate to domestic and foreign tax evaders.10
?? ??????? ????????? ??????? ??? ??? ???? ??? ?????? ????????? ??????? ????? ???
significant assets or ongoing business activities, and which is capable of 
moving assets and large sums of money globally.11  Shell companies typically 
have no presence other than a mailing address, have no employees, and produce 
little or no independent economic value.12  It is not uncommon to find 
hundreds, if not thousands, of shell entities registered to the same address 
4. Shima Baradaran, Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson & Jason Sharman, Funding Terror, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 477, 492 (2014). 
5.   FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF), TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 8 
(Oct. 2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-transparency-
beneficial-ownership.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PSH-M2D4]. 
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. EMILE VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS, EMILY M. HALTER, ROBERT A. HARRISON, JI WON
PARK & J.C. SHARMAN, THE PUPPET MASTERS: HOW THE CORRUPT USE LEGAL STRUCTURES TO 
HIDE STOLEN ASSETS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 19 (2011). 
9. Dean Kalant, Who’s in Charge Here? Requiring More Transparency in Corporate America: 
Advancements in Beneficial Ownership for Privately Held Companies, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1049, 
1052?54 (2009). 
10. Adam Szubin, A Dangerous Shell Game, THE HILL (July 11, 2016, 5:48 PM), 
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/287291-a-dangerous-shell-game [https://perma.cc/AU7G-QV8U]. 
11. FIN. CRIMES ENF?T NETWORK (FINCEN), U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, THE ROLE OF 
DOMESTIC SHELL COMPANIES IN FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING: LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES 4 (2006). 
12. Id.
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because most shells have no operations.13  They are sometimes formed with a 
???????? ??????? ???????? ????? ??? ???? ???????? ??????????? ?????????????? ????? ???
domestic and cross-border currency and asset transfers, or to facilitate corporate 
mergers and reorganization???14
Shell entities are not always formed for illegal purposes, and they are even 
a valuable source of tax revenues in some countries.  For example, shell entities 
in the Netherlands are involved in about $1 trillion in transactions each year 
with the taxes paid on these transactions serving as an important government 
revenue source.15  Shell entities can be publicly traded or privately owned.   
Privately owned shell entities tend to be more susceptible to tax evasion 
because limited ownership limits public exposure and eases the cloaking of 
beneficial ownership.16  For this reason, privately owned shell entities have 
become the financial and deception vehicles of choice for tax evaders.17   
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????o the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ??????????????
entities.18  The Paradise Papers contained 13.4 million leaked documents mostly 
13. One building in the Grand Caymans known as Ugland House is officially the registered home 
of 18,000 companies. The Missing $20 Trillion, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 2013, at 13.  Another 
address of interest is P.O. Box 3444, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands.  A Google search of 
this address yields more than 600,000 hits. Ryan C. Hubbs, Shell Games: Investigating Shell 
Companies and Understanding Their Roles in International Fraud, FRAUD MAG., July/Aug., 2014, 
http://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.aspx?id=4294983054 [https://perma.cc/2XVS-ZBCZ].  In 
Delaware, 285,000 companies are registered in just one building. Oxfam & Richard Teather, Tax 
Haven or Tax Hell?, INT?L. TAX REV. June 2016, at 23.  
14. FINCEN, supra note 11, at 4.
15. Gregory Crouch, Shaken Trust: The Netherlands Rethinks an Offshore Industry, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2004, at C1, C15. 
16. FINCEN, supra note 11, at 4. 
17. Hubbs, supra note 13. 
18. Mike Murphy, Paradise Papers: 6 Things to Know About Report Exposing Tax Havens of 
the Mega-Rich, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 6, 2017, 2:42 AM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/paradise-papers-6-things-to-know-about-report-exposing-tax-
havens-of-the-mega-rich-2017-11-05 [https://perma.cc/6XHF-ABW6].  As a result of the Panama 
Papers leak, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) executed three search warrants on February 14, 2018, 
during an offshore tax evasion criminal investigation. Canada Revenue Agency, Canada Revenue 
Agency Conducts Panama Papers Related Searches in Multiple Locations, GOV?T OF CANADA (Feb. 
14, 2018), https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/news/newsroom/criminal-investigations-
actions-charges-convictions/20180214-canada-revenue-agency-conducts-panama-papers-related-
searches-multiple-locations.html [https://perma.cc/34A5-2NGF]??????????????????????????????????????
a series of transactions involving foreign perpetrators and several transfers through offshore bank 
accounts allegedly used to evade taxes. Id. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
evasion cases that CRA is presently investigating which involve complex structures and potentially 
multi-??????????????????????????????????Id.   
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from the Bermuda-based law firm Appleby and Singapore-based Asiaciti 
Trust.19  The Papers detail the ways politicians, celebrities, and the ultra-rich 
?protect their cash from taxes, hide ownership of major assets and conduct 
business in secret.?20  Most of the exposed practices are legal, but some may be 
unethical.21  For example, ?Stephen Bronfman, a top aide and key fundraiser of 
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, was found to have avoided millions 
in taxes through offshore accounts.?22  Although the conduct was not illegal, it 
was very embarrassing for Trudeau, who had pledged to crackdown on tax 
havens.23
While there is a significant literature in law, accounting, and economics that 
examines tax evasion,24 there is scant information on how shell entities actually 
facilitate tax evasion.  The extensive abuse and illegitimate use of domestic and 
offshore entities to evade taxes make such entities an important aspect of the 
work of forensic accountants, law enforcement, auditors, and regulators.  
Hence, the purpose of this article is to analyze the use and application of shell 
entities and lack of ownership transparency as they facilitate tax evasion, 
impede investigations, and harm societies.   
The first section below discusses the importance of secrecy or concealment 
and then analyzes the use and abuse of shell entities to achieve such secrecy 
(often for illegal purposes).  The second section analyzes different types of legal 
or business structures that are and have been used as shell entities.  The first 
two sections are intended to provide the reader historical context about shell 
entities.  The third section discusses the suggested reasons for the vulnerability 
of various business structures that, when privately owned, are easily 
manipulated to operate as shell entities.  Lack of ownership transparency is 
covered to varying degrees in the first three sections.  The fourth section 
highlights policy reactions and responses, including legislation, dealing with 
beneficial ownership problems, the use and abuse of various shell entities, and 
the ability of forensic accountants and law enforcement to combat and reduce 
tax evasion.  The final section concludes the paper.   
19. Murphy, supra note 18. 
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND 
GOV?TAL AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., REP. ON TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND 
SECRECY (2006); Jeffrey Simser, Tax Evasion and Avoidance Typologies, 11 J. MONEY LAUNDERING 
CONTROL 123 (2008). 
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I. EVADERS ENJOY CONCEALMENT AND SECRECY
A correlation exists between corruption and anonymous shell entities.  
Tracing illicit funds or assets and tax evasion to a shell entity is not that useful 
if the individuals who control it (i.e., beneficial owners) cannot be identified.25
International standards on beneficial owners have been tightened in recent years 
but remain quite loose.26  Practice varies substantially, with some offshore 
financial centers having had ownership registries for years; while in the United 
States, corporate formation agents and trust and company service providers 
(TCSPs) are not licensed and beneficial ownership information is not collected 
and verified.27
By necessity, tax evaders are attracted to jurisdictions with liberal financial 
secrecy laws and practices.  Such jurisdictions facilitate secrecy and thereby 
provide relatively weak barriers to the abuse of domestic and offshore shell 
entities, trusts, foundations, shelf corporations, IBCs, LLCs, and other business 
structures.28  In 2009, the Tax Justice Network (TJN) launched an online 
database that shows how the legal, judicial, and regulatory details of different 
jurisdictions contribute to the environment of financial secrecy.29  A global 
ranking of financial secrecy, called the Financial Secrecy Index (FSI), draws 
attention to the various aspects of financial secrecy.30  According to the TJN, 
an estimated $21 trillion to $32 trillion of private financial wealth is located in 
secrecy jurisdictions around the world.31  Secrecy jurisdictions use concealment 
and anti-disclosure laws to attract illicit and illegitimate financial flows.32  Illicit 
cross-border financial flows have been estimated at $1?$1.6 trillion per year.33
Offshore companies in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) alone had assets in 
excess of $1.5 trillion in early 2017.34
The FSI indicates that traditional stereotypes of tax havens and secrecy are 
inaccurate.  ????????????????? ????????ant providers of financial secrecy, the 
25. See Szubin, supra note 10. 
26. Id.
27. John Christensen, The Hidden Trillions: Secrecy, Corruption, and the Offshore Interface, 57
CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 335 (2012).  
28. Id. at 326. 
29. Id. at 329.  
30. Id. 
31. Financial Secrecy Index, TAX JUST. NETWORK (Jan. 30, 2018),
http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com [https://perma.cc/5LT3-BYLN]. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Vanessa Houlder, Offshore Assets Held in British Virgin Islands Double Over 7 Years to 
$1.5tn, FIN. TIMES (London), June 21, 2017, at 1. 
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places that harbor the most concealed assets, are mostly not small palm-fringed 
islands but rather Switzerland, the United States, Singapore, Luxembourg, and 
Germany.35  In 2017, the United States ranked second in terms of providing 
financial secrecy.36
II. ENTITIES USED TO FACILITATE EVASION
Tax evaders and others can use shell entities to commit tax evasion and 
often, the related offense of money laundering.37  The cleverest schemes 
insulate the tax evader through many layers of shell entities, such as a trust, 
LLC, and others.  Such schemes also incorporate misdirection by creating the 
appearance that the wrongdoer has no control of the shell entity, and that those 
in control of the entity are in an offshore jurisdiction.38
One example of how a tax evader layered offshore asset protection trusts 
(OAPTs)39 is United States v. Scott.40 An organization named International 
Business Associates (IBA) devised a scheme involving transfers to and among 
four successive trusts.41  Trust I was a domestic trust established ?as a shell with 
an apparently fictitious contribution of $100 by some entity other than? the 
client.42  Trust I was required to distribute all taxable income to Trust II (a 
35. Financial Secrecy Index, supra note 31.
36. Lynnley Browning, Report Says U.S. is World’s Second-Biggest Tax Haven, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 30, 2018, 11:00 AM) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-30/u-s-seen-as-world-
s-second-biggest-tax-haven-after-switzerland [https://perma.cc/73GL-SW9P]. 
37. Although tax evasion and money laundering are separate and distinct offenses, there is a 
distinct similarity between the methods used for money laundering and tax evasion. Bryan S. Arce, 
Taken to the Cleaners: Panama’s Financial Secrecy Laws Facilitate the Laundering of Evaded U.S. 
Taxes, 34 BROOK. J. INT?L. L. 465, 465?66, 471 (2009).  Both require deception (or an act of fraud) 
and concealment, and when assets from illegal activity are shielded from tax officials, a direct overlap 
occurs between the two. Id. at 471.  Once money evades taxes, it must be laundered before it can be 
used again. Id.   
38. Id. at 471?72.  
39. An offshore asset protection trust (OAPT) is a type of spendthrift trust that is established in 
a nation or jurisdiction outside the U.S. Richard C. Ausness, The Offshore Asset Protection Trust: A 
Prudent Financial Planning Device or the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel?, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 147, 149, 
152 (2007).  Unlike most U.S. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-?????????
spendthrift trusts, that is, trusts . . . ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id.  
Various jurisdictions that permit OAPTs are Anguilla, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the BVI, the 
Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, the Isle of Man, Saint Kitts-Nevis, and the Turks 
and Caicos Islands. Id. at 152; Trent Maxwell, Comment, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: A Threat 
to Child Support?, 2014 BYU L. REV. 477, 482.  
40. 37 F.3d 1564 (10th Cir. 1994). 
41. Id. at 1570. 
42. Id. 
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Belizean trust).43  Trust ????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
a U.S. tax return.44  Trust II was a conduit trust that passed its income to Trust 
III, an alleged foreign trust that could distribute and accumulate income.45  Trust 
IV was a passive foreign trust until the purchaser of the trust needed funds.46
Like most OAPT tax evasion schemes, power rested with the purchaser-client 
while the true beneficial owner remained unnamed in all documentation.47
Such abuses are compounded by states, provinces, and countries that permit 
shell entities to own and manage other shell entities.48  The result can be 
multiple layers of cloaked ownership that make it virtually impossible for 
forensic accountants and tax officials to determine the identity of beneficial 
owners.   
A. LLCs as Shells 
Because LLCs may be owned and managed anonymously, they can be 
subject to abuse.  Ownership transparency requirements vary from state-to-state 
and country-to-country.49  LLCs provide members (rather than shareholders) 
the same limited liability afforded to corporate shareholders while at the same 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????50  When used 
as shell entities, LLCs exist only to hold or own other entities or bank accounts, 
or as simply as a transfer point for moving funds from one account or business 
to another.   
?????????????????????????????????can be structured in a variety of forms, 
including having shares ?issued to a natural or legal person or in registered or 
bearer from.??51  Bearer shares (not permitted in the United States) confer rights 
of ownership to a company upon the physical holder or possessor of the 
shares.52  They are commonly and legitimately used in a number of countries.53
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 1571. 
48. See FINCEN, supra note 11, at 10.  
49. See U.S. GOVT. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-06-376, COMPANY FORMATIONS:
MINIMAL OWNERSHIP INFORMATION IS COLLECTED AND AVAILABLE 41?42 (2006),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06376.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZC2-J6CR]. 
50. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 160. 
51. Max Biedermann, G8 Principles: Identifying the Anonymous, 11 BYU INT?L L. & MGT. REV.
72, 75?76 (2015) (quoting FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF), THE MISUSE OF CORPORATE 
VEHICLES, INCLUDING TRUST AND COMPANY SERVICE PROVIDERS 1 (2006)). 
52. Id. at 76. 
53. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 41, 43?44.  
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However, given that bearer shares are not registered as to ownership, they 
enable the commission of tax evasion and can be controlled by beneficial 
owners who may be unidentifiable.54
LLCs are easy to form (in as little as two hours for about $100?$200 in 
some states)55 and can be linked or layered across different jurisdictions, 
creating a confusing path for forensic accountants, auditors, and tax 
investigators.56  If they are established in a jurisdiction that has no regard for 
ownership transparency (e.g., Wyoming, Nevada, Delaware, Cayman Islands), 
then identifying the beneficial owners may become virtually impossible.57  The 
United States ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
avoid ownership transparency.  In fact, U.S. LLC shells are used more often in 
laundering the proceeds of grand corruption, which often escape taxation, than 
the LLC shells of any other country.58
A fine example of the abuse of LLC shells for tax evasion occurred in 
United States v. Stegman.59 In September 1997, Kathleen Stegman formed a 
Kansas corporation called Midwest Medical Aesthetics Center, Inc.60  In 
January 1998, a certificate of amendment was filed to show an entity name 
change to Midwest Medical Aesthetics Center, P.A. (Midwest).61  Stegman 
established several LLCs, including Samson, LLC.  Stegman used the LLCs to 
launder Midwest client payments.62  She used the LLCs to buy money orders 
that she, in turn, used to purchase items for personal use.63  From 2007 to 2009, 
Stegman purchased $272,748 in money orders yet she reported zero cash 
income on her federal income tax returns.64  In October 2010, an IRS criminal 
investigation report ?noted that Midwest took in large amounts of cash, yet 
made no deposits in 2007 or 2008,? and ???????Stegma???? ?lavish? lifestyle, 
which included frequent travel? and large asset purchases of about $2,000,000 
54. Id. at 41, 44. 
55. Biedermann, supra note 51, at 76.  
56. Idelys Martinez, Comment, The Shell Game: An Easy Hide-and-Go-Seek Game for 
Criminals Around the World, 29 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 185, 196?97 (2017). 
57. See generally JAY D. ADKISSON & CHRISTOPHER M. RISER, ASSET PROTECTION: CONCEPTS 
AND STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING YOUR WEALTH (2004). 
58. Jason Sharman, Shell Companies and Asset Recovery: Piercing the Corporate Veil, in
EMERGING TRENDS IN ASSET RECOVERY 67, 68 (Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel, Charles Monteith & 
Pedro Gomes Pereira eds., 2013). 
59. 873 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2017). 
60. Id. at 1219. 
61. Id. 
62. Id.   
63. Id.   
64. Id.   
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(mostly real estate).65  Stegman also engaged in obstructive conduct as she 
???????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
records.66  Stegman was convicted of tax evasion and other charges and 
sentenced to fifty-one months in prison.67  Other cases also demonstrate how 
LLCs are abused to commit tax evasion.68
B. Shelf Corporations 
Existing but unused shell companies may be converted to current, possibly 
illegal, use.  Such companies are known as shelf or aged corporations.69  The 
established age of these companies adds to their credibility.70 Their 
attractiveness includes instant availability, immediate ownership due to any 
legal filing requirements having already been satisfied, and no shares having 
yet been offered.71  In general, domestic and offshore shelf corporations possess 
all the necessary prerequisites in the appropriate jurisdiction (e.g., Wyoming, 
65. Id. at 1220.   
66. Id.   
67. Id. at 1221.   
68. In Nevada Partners Fund, L.L.C. v. United States, James Kelley Williams, a successful 
Mississippi businessman, expected to realize an $18 million capital gain in tax year 2001 from the 
cancellation of a loan he had guaranteed. 720 F.3d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 2013).  Williams entered into a 
long-term investment program offered by Bricolage Capital, LLC. Id. at 599?600.  Bricolage enlisted 
Credit Suisse-?????????? ????????? ????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
execute foreign exchange and other transactions that generate tax losses. Id.   
??????????????????????????? three-tier investment strategy. Id. at 600. The first tier involved establishing 
an LLC with a transitory partner/manager to act as a holding company for other funds. Id.  “The first-
tier LLC would own 99% of a second LLC, which would own 99% of a third ??????Id.  “The two 
lower-???????????? ????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????Id.  ???????????
tier LLC would enter into sets of currency forward contracts . . . that would [yield] offsetting gains and 
?????????Id.  At a certain point, the investor-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????-????????? ??????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
(Williams). Id. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????ams] enough basis in the LLCs 
to take advantage of the embedded loss[es] . . . ????????????Id. 
The three domestic LLCs were Nevada Partners, Carson Partners, and Reno Partners. Id. at 601.  
Williams made his required investments in the LLCs using the JKW 1991 Revocable Trust, which held 
most of his wealth. Id. at 602.  Numerous purchases of LLCs and other interests occurred to transfer 
the necessary tax losses to Williams, which he claimed on his 2001 tax return. Id.   
?????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ed economic 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
three domestic LLCs were not entitled to the reasonable cause defense. Id. at 619.   
69. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 37.  
70. Biedermann, supra note 51, at 77. 
71. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 37?38.
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Nevada, St. Kitts-Nevis) for legal operation and quick transfer of ownership.72 ?
Shelf corporations may be purchased on the internet for a few thousand dollars 
from TCSPs such as https://www.offshorecompany.com and 
https://www.companiesinc.com.73  In some cases, shelf entities can even be 
bought with ready-made, established bank accounts.74
Once a shelf company is bought, the buyer may acquire the shelf 
?????????????? ???????????? ??????? ???? ???? ????????? ?????? ???????? ????????? ????
credibility.75  The lack of accurate and recorded information about shelf entities 
can create almost insurmountable obstacles for auditors, forensic accountants, 
IRS investigators, and regulators in any attempt to identify the beneficial 
owner(s).76
C. Using Nominees or Nominee Directors in Shell Entities 
Another legal device or approach to optimize concealment is for the shell 
???????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
director.  A nominee is one who holds bare legal title for another, or is 
designated to act in place of another in a limited way, ?or who receives and 
distributes funds for the benefit of others.?77  A nominee can be a relative, 
friend, trusted associate, or a person who has no link to the true beneficial 
owner(s).78 Nominee incorporation services 
(http://www.offshoresimple.com/nominee/htm) provide local (related to the 
jurisdiction of the shell entity) or third-party nominees who will be the director 
or manager of the shell firm.79  The nominee typically signs a general power of 
attorney which gives the beneficial owner(s) full power to manage the shell 
72. Debra Cassens Weiss, Wyoming Home is a ‘Little Cayman Island’ for Shell Companies,
ABA J. (June 28, 2011, 4:09 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/wyoming_home_is_a_little_cayman_island_for_shell_comp
anies [https://perma.cc/DXY2-ZMZ3]. 
73. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 38; FINCEN, supra note 11, at 5?6.
74. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 38; FINCEN, supra note 11, at 6. 
75. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 37?38. 
76. Id. at 38?39.  
77. Martinez, supra note 56, at 197 n.57; see also LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 119 
(2d Cir. 1997). 
78. See LiButti, 107 F.3d at 119; Anonymous Companies, GLOB. FIN. INTEGRITY,
https://www.gfintegrity.org/issue/anonymous-companies [https://perma.cc/BVK4-FGFD] (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2018).  
79. Martinez, supra note 56, at 197 n.58.  
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entity.80  The nominee also provides a signed and undated letter of resignation 
to further protect the anonymity of the beneficial owner(s).81
A mere twenty-eight nominee directors have established or are in control 
of more than 21,000 companies.82  And many of these individuals have been 
identified as being involved with criminal organizations and individuals.83
They market their services by selling their names and addresses in obscure 
global locations.84  The shell entities themselves are ?often registered 
anonymously . . . in the British Virgin Islands, but also in Ireland, New 
Zealand, Belize and the UK itself.?85  In early 2014, the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) (over 190 journalists from 65 
countries) published a database of the incorporation records of shell companies, 
directors (some nominees), and addresses that was leaked to them.86  The 
database shows the extent of shell company networks and how many companies 
and nominee directors are linked together.87
D. Trusts 
Trusts are another vehicle subject to abuse by tax evaders, fraudsters, and 
other criminals.  The salient characteristic of a trust is that it provides for a 
separation of legal and beneficial ownership.88  Legal control is granted to a 
trustee by a settlor (a.k.a., a creator or grantor), who manages the trust asset(s) 
according to the terms of a trust agreement for the benefit of beneficiaries.89  A 
settlor, creator, or grantor, who establishes the trust, can minimize the transfer, 
80. ADKISSON & RISER, supra note 57, at 201; Nominee Service–Officers, Directors and 
Managers, COS. INC., https://companiesinc.com/grow-your-business-/nominee-service 
[https://perma.cc/K25K-YYAL] (last visited Mar. 23, 2018); Nominee Services, GWS GRP.,
https://gws-offshore.com/nominee-services [https://perma.cc/PC2Y-HY7A] (last visited Mar. 23, 
2018). 
81. ADKISSON & RISER, supra note 57; Nominee Service–Officers, Directors and Managers,
supra note 80; Nominee Services, supra note 80.
82. James Ball, Offshore Secrets: How Many Companies Do ‘Sham Directors’ Control?, THE 
GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/datablog/2012/nov/26/offshore-secrets-companies-
sham-directors [https://perma.cc/DF5K-86JN] (last visited Aug. 31, 2018).  
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Int?l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, About, OFFSHORE LEAKS DATABASE,
https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/pages/about [https://perma.cc/763U-E2K9] (last visited Aug. 14, 2018).  
87. Id. 
88. Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
287, 290 (2002). 
89. Id.
2018] SHELL ENTITIES AND LACK OF OWNERSHIP TRANSPARENCY 123 
???????????? ??? ??????????? ??? ?? ?????????????? ?????? ????????? ??? ????????? ??
spendthrift trust (also called an asset protection trust) or including a spendthrift 
provision in the trust.90  One bright line rule employed by courts in some 
jurisdictions, especially in the majority of U.S. states, is that any self-settled 
trust (one in which the creator or grantor is also a beneficiary), regardless of 
whether it includes a so-called spendthrift provision, cannot be a spendthrift 
trust.91  Although virtually all states recognize spendthrift provisions, most do 
not permit a settlor who is also a beneficiary to protect his or her assets from 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
other claims).92 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
own benefit.93
In many jurisdictions (onshore and offshore), a spendthrift trust may be 
implemented by including a spendthrift clause or provision in the trust 
instrument.94  Self-settled spendthrift trusts, which have been given the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
companies, and estate planners, both [in the United States] and abroad.  They 
[are] a multi-billion-dollar-a-????? ??????????95  Many U.S. and offshore 
promoters attract U.S., Canadian, and other citizens with promises of tax 
avoidance (which in some cases is evasion) and asset protection through the use 
of trusts.96  In this way, they are quite similar to the use of LLC shell 
companies.97  In fact, an asset protection trust is a type of shell entity.   
The popularity of asset protection trusts is based, in large part, on the fact 
that trusts provide beneficiaries with more privacy and autonomy than do 
traditional business entities.  ???????? ????? ??? ????????????? ????????????? ???
??????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????98
????????????????????????????????ties must be disclosed, the beneficiary can be 
90. See Miller v. Kresser, 34 So. 3d 172, 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Croom v. Ocala 
Plumbing & Elec. Co., 57 So. 243, 244 (Fla. 1911)). 
91. In re Brown, 303 F.3d 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2002). 
92. Ausness, supra note 39, at 150?51. 
93. Brown, 303 F.3d at 1266 (emphasis omitted). 
94. Nicole F. Stowell, Erik Johanson & Carl Pacini, The Use of Wills and Asset Protection Trusts 
in Fraud and Other Financial Crimes, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 509, 525 (2017). 
95. Jeffrey A. Morse, Nevada Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts or Offshore Trusts?, NEV. LAW.,
Mar. 2008, at 16, 16. 
96. Id. 
97. Stowell, Johanson & Pacini, supra note 94, at 526; VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., 
supra note 8, at 168?70.  
98. Stowell, Johanson & Pacini, supra note 94, at 527. 
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a limited partnership, LLC, or another trust, and this ?add[s] layers of opacity 
????????????????????????????????????99  If the trust is drafted by an attorney, the 
attorney?client privilege erects an additional barrier to transparency.  Due to 
these secrecy features, trusts are very much subject to abuse.100
 Offshore asset protection trusts (OAPTs) possess a number of features that 
permit the settlor to exercise protective control over trust assets.  Protective 
features of an OAPT may include a trust protector clause, an anti-duress clause, 
a flee or flight clause, and a non-binding letter of intent or wishes.101  A trust 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to act as an advisor and who is responsible for making sure the trustee 
????????????????????????????????102  An anti-duress clause prohibits the trustee 
from complying with any order imposed upon the settlor or trustee.103  A flee 
or flight clause authorizes the trustee to transfer the trust to another jurisdiction 
upon the occurrence of certain events, such as an inquiry from a foreign 
government or Interpol.104  A letter of intent or wishes is written by the settlor 
and states his or her wishes as to the dissipation of trust assets.105  The control 
offered the settlor by these features contribute to the abuse of OAPTs as a shell 
entity to evade taxes.   
OAPTs can be utilized in two ways by those bent on committing tax 
evasion: 1) hiding legitimate interest-earning assets for the purpose of evading 
taxes106 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????107  The linchpins to illegitimate uses or abuses of 
OAPTs are layering and misdirection.108
Just as with other types of shell entities, the goal is to transfer income-
earning assets through enough layers of OAPTs and other shell entities so that 
a banker, lawyer, forensic accountant, auditor, or IRS agent will not suspect or 
99. Id. at 527?28. 
100. See id. at 528; Ausness, supra note 39, at 154?55. 
101. James T. Lorenzetti, The Offshore Trust: A Contemporary Asset Protection Scheme, 102 
COM. L.J. 138, 146?49 (1997). 
102. Id. at 149.  
103. Id. at 146; Harvey M. Silets & Michael C. Drew, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Tax 
Planning or Tax Fraud?, 5 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 9, 10?11 (2001). 
104. Ausness, supra note 39, at 156. 
105. Id.; Lorenzetti, supra note 101, at 149. 
106. Silets & Drew, supra note 103, at 9. 
107. Id.; Bruce Zagaris, A Brave New World: Recent Developments in Anti-Money Laundering 
and Related Litigation Traps for the Unwary in International Trust Matters, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT?L.
L. 1023, 1027 (1999). 
108. Silets & Drew, supra note 103, at 9. 
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discover the sources or beneficial owners of assets.109  By accomplishing this 
goal, individuals and entities can control their income-earning assets and tax 
liabilities without being named as a beneficiary or trustee.110  The privacy and 
anonymity of OAPTs make them a superb means of evading taxes and 
laundering assets and vulnerable to various forms of illegal and unethical abuse.   
E.  Limited Partnerships (LPs) and Family Limited Partnerships (FLPs) 
LPs and FLPs are excellent places to hide income-earning assets and evade 
taxes.111  In a typical scheme involving an LP, the tax evader (general partner) 
provides trusted associates, friends, or family members income-earning assets 
to invest in an LP.112 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
personal legal liability for the debts of the business, including tax liabilities, and 
cannot take an active role in operating the business.113  Another scheme 
involving an LP occurs when the tax evader conveys income-earning assets to 
an LP of which the tax fraudster is the sole limited partner and then transfers 
the partnership interest to a trust of which the tax evader is the sole trustee and 
beneficiary (usually done on an offshore basis).114
In an attempt to hide interest-earning assets or obscure the beneficial owner, 
an FLP might be arranged in which a married couple contributes all of their 
assets to the FLP.  In this structure, each spouse retains a 1% general partnership 
interest and a 49% limited partnership interest.115  General partners in an FLP 
????? ?????????? ????????? ?????????? ???? ???? ?????? ???? ?ebts and other 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Asher Rubinstein, Efficacy of Family Limited Partnerships: A Case Study, GALLET 
DREYER & BERKEY, LLP (Feb. 23, 2013), https://www.gdblaw.com/efficacy-of-family-limited-
partnership [https://perma.cc/3BT7-G8J8]; David Cay Johnston, Ex-I.R.S. Agent Says Tax Evasion by 
Real Estate Partners is Huge, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/business/07taxes.html [https://perma.cc/J83S-TZNZ]. 
112.  Rubinstein, supra note 111; Johnston, supra note 111.  
113. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL, supra note 8, at 161. 
114. Howard Rosen & Patricia Donlevy-Rosen, Offshore Trust/Offshore LLC Combination: 
Significant Improvement Over Partnership/Trust Structure, ASSET PROTECTION NEWS (Donlevy-
Rosen & Rosen, P.A., Coral Gables, FL.), Apr./May 2001, https://protectyou.com/2001/04/offshore-
trust-offshore-llc-combination-significant-improvement-over-partnership-trust-structure/ 
[https://perma.cc/WG6A-J2K8]. 
115.  See generally Rebecca B. Hawblitzel, Case Note, A Change in Planning: Estate of Strangi 
v. Commissioner’s Effect on the Use of Family Limited Partnerships in Estate Planning, 57 ARK. L.
REV. 595 (2004). 
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obligations.116  Using this arrangement subjects only 2% ???????????????????????
to unlimited liability.  In the United States, there have been some cases in which 
a court has ruled ?????????????????????????????? FLP can be foreclosed upon by a 
creditor.117
F. International Business Companies (IBCs) 
An IBC is an offshore corporation closely related to the traditional 
corporation since it employs articles of incorporation or association and 
requires company directors.118  An IBC is an entity targeted at non-residents of 
the jurisdiction in which the IBC is sited.119  It also may not engage in economic 
activities within its situs jurisdiction.120  In most jurisdictions, an IBC is 
governed by strict confidentiality regulations as the names of its shareholders 
and directors need not be published in any public register.121  Also, although 
shareholders of many IBCs are required to elect directors, once elected the 
board may run the IBC with little recourse to shareholders.122  In some IBC 
jurisdictions, the abolition of share capital allows the IBC to ignore capital 
retention in making distributions to shareholders.123  The freedom in making or 
not making distributions to shareholders makes the IBC a convenient vehicle 
for tax evasion, money laundering, and moving money around to many different 
locations to obscure the money trail for auditors, forensic accountants, and tax 
investigators.   
An IBC is a subcategory of LLCs that is used as a tool by corporations and 
individuals throughout the world to direct profits away from high-tax countries 
into offshore jurisdictions that have low or zero tax rates and tax treaties with 
other nations (double tax treaties).  For example, more than 140 listed 
businesses in London, New York, and Hong Kong have a unit in the BVI which 
is useful as a tax neutral hub.124
116.  Kiara Ashanti, What is a Family Limited Partnership (FLP): Pros and Cons, MONEY 
CRASHERS, https://www.moneycrashers.com/family-limited-partnership-flp [https://perma.cc/5KMZ-
7M24] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
117. See, e.g., Firmani v. Firmani, 752 A.2d 854, 855?56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) 
(illustrating an unsuccessful scheme to hide assets using an FLP). 
118. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), BEHIND THE CORPORATE VEIL: USING 
CORPORATE ENTITIES FOR ILLICIT PURPOSES 24 (2001).  
119. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 266.  
120. Id.
121. OECD, supra note 118, at 24.  
122. Id.
123. Offshore: British Virgin Islands, THE LAWYER, June 13, 2005, at 26, 29. 
124. Houlder, supra note 34, at 1. 
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G. Private Interest Foundations (PIFs) and Company Foundations (CFs) 
The PIF is a vehicle provided by civil law countries (now being adopted by 
some common law countries) for tax management, estate planning purposes, 
asset protection, and as an alternative to trusts.125  The PIF was first introduced 
in Monaco in 1922 but has attracted followers such as Liechtenstein, Panama, 
the Bahamas, Costa Rica, St. Kitts-Nevis, Anguilla, and Antigua.126  Although 
there is no single definition of a foundation, a number of common features can 
be identified in jurisdictions that offer PIFs.   
Panama is a good example since it has permitted PIFs since 1995,127 has 
more than 400,000 registered offshore corporations and PIFs, does not require 
foundations to keep financial records or submit tax returns, and offers much 
secrecy.128  A PIF has four main parts: 
1. Founder- the person or entity that forms the foundation in the public 
registry.  Usually a nominee founder is provided by a TCSP along with a pre-
signed, undated letter of resignation.129  At that point, the nominee founder 
holds no control.  A founder is analogous to a trustee; 
2. Foundation Council- serves the same function for a PIF as a board of 
directors does for a corporation.130 ?????????????? ???????????????????????????
numbers are noted in the public registry when the foundation is established.131
Often a nominee council is provided along with pre-signed, undated letters of 
resignation from the nominee council;132
3. Protector- the ultimate controller of the foundation.  Immediately upon 
establishment, the council appoints a protector through a notarized private 
protectorate document.133  Since the document is a private, non-publicly 
125. Dayra Berbey de Rojas, Panama: The Role of the Protector in the Private Interest 
Foundation, 14 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 350, 350 (2008). 
126. Harry Wiggin, Anguilla: Foundations and Trusts–A Comparison, 14 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES
287, 287 (2008).  
127. Id.
128. Adam Thomson, The Cost of Privacy: Tax and Trading in Panama, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 30, 
2010), https://www.ft.com/search?sort=relevance&q=the+cost+of+privacy+53A+tax+and+trading+i
n+panama+and+thomson [https://perma.cc/QP5C-XB9M]. 
129. Elements of a Panama Private Interest Foundation, PAN. OFFSHORE SERVS.,
http://www.panama-offshore-services.com/foundation_elements.htm [https://perma.cc/WLF3-VTL9]  
(last visited Aug. 2, 2018). 
130. Id.
131. Id. 
132. Id.
133. Id.
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registered document, the protector remains anonymous.134  At that point, the 
protector has full control over the foundation (which holds legal title to any 
assets) and its assets;135 and 
4. Beneficiaries- a PIF does not have owners, but rather beneficiaries.136
The latter are appointed by the protector either through a private letter of wishes 
or through a formal set of by-laws.137  The contents of both remain confidential.  
Privately appointed beneficiaries remain anonymous.138
In sum, no legal requirement exists to disclose the name of the founder, 
beneficiaries, or protector.  There is no filing of an annual tax return or financial 
statement.139  A foundation may ?engage in any business or civil transaction in 
any part of the world and in any currency.?140  Moreover, the foundation charter 
may be signed by an attorney without disclosing the founder.141   
In some foundation jurisdictions (e.g., Anguilla), any assets available for 
distribution to a beneficiary ?are not capable of being alienated or passed by 
bankruptcy, insolvency, or liquidation, or liable to be seized, sold, attached, or 
otherwise taken in execution, by process of law.?142  The secrecy or lack of 
transparency and flexibility of PIFs have led to their spread throughout the 
offshore world.143  Such foundations represent another vehicle that can be used 
by tax evaders.   
In the last quarter of 2017, the Cayman Islands implemented a new legal 
structure known as a Company Foundation (CF) that could be used as a shell 
entity.144  A CF shares some features with a trust but may be established so 
beneficiaries are given no rights to make a claim against the CF.145  The CF law 
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.; Francesca Di Gregori Boschini, Private Foundations and Reserved Powers Trusts, TR.
& EST., Apr. 2006, at 46, 48.  
138. Boschini, supra note 137, at 48?49; ASPEN GRP. LTD., A GUIDE TO PANAMANIAN PRIVATE 
INTEREST FOUNDATIONS 3 (2012), 
http://www.aspenoffshore.com/files/docs/2012/11/a_guide_to_panamanian_private_interest_foundati
on_new_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB2V-QN66]; Elements of a Panama Private Interest Foundation,
supra note 129. 
139. Boschini, supra note 137, at 48. 
140. ASPEN GRP. LTD., supra note 138, at 4. 
141. Id.
142. Wiggin, supra note 126, at 289. 
143. Id. at 287, 290. 
144. Ray Davern & Alex Way, Notes from a Small Island: Some Observations on the New 
Cayman Islands Foundation Company, 23 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 916, 916 (2017). 
145. Id. at 918.
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itself describes possible objects of a CF such as acting as a holding company or 
an investment company.146  Another feature of a CF that trusts do not possess 
is that any kind of power can be given to any person, whether as a personal 
power, as a benefit for the CF, or for any other lawful purpose.147  These objects 
and powers make the CF vulnerable to abuse by tax evaders.  Only the passage 
of time will indicate whether the CF will be added to the list of legal structures 
that serve as shell entities for tax evasion.   
III. THREE MAIN REASONS SHELL ENTITIES PROVIDE SECRECY AND DISGUISE 
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP TO FACILITATE TAX EVASION
Three main reasons explain the continued ability of tax evaders to use shell 
entities to conceal the identity of their actual beneficial owners and to operate 
in the shadows.  One reason is the lack of transparency in most jurisdictions 
(including U.S. states) with regard to actual or beneficial owners, directors, 
corporate officers, members, partners, trustees, beneficiaries, and others.  The 
second reason is that tax evaders require the services of professionals such as 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
shell entities, layer or pyramid entities together into complicated webs of 
anonymous entities, hide assets, evade taxes, and launder funds.  The third 
reason is that the layering or pyramiding of different shell entities (often 
different legal structures) in various jurisdictions around the globe makes an 
impenetrable trail for tax investigators and forensic accountants to follow.   
A. Lack of Beneficial Ownership Transparency 
Ownership transparency refers to disclosing majority and minority 
shareholders, members, beneficiaries, protectors, trustees, founders, and 
directors, depending upon the type of legal entity, or any other natural person 
who is in a position to control and benefit from an asset.148  Transparency also 
includes knowledge of the controlling structure of other legal entities.  
?Knowledge of beneficial owners and the control structures of [entities] must 
then be accompanied by effective investigation and enforcement mechanisms 
regarding disclosed information.?149
146. A New Vehicle for the Cayman Trusts Industry: The Foundation Company, MAPLES (Feb. 
15, 2017), https://www.maplesandcalder.com/news/article/a-new-vehicle-for-the-cayman-trusts-
industry-the-foundation-company-1434/ [https://perma.cc/37VC-28P3].   
147. Davern & Way, supra note 144, at 919.
148. Avnita Lakhani, Imposing Company Ownership Transparency Requirements: 
Opportunities for Effective Governance of Equity Capital Markets or Constraints on Corporate 
Performance, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INT?L. & COMP. L. 122, 128?29 (2016).  
149. Id. at 129. 
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The issue of transparency is captured by FATF Recommendation 24, which 
states that ?countries should ensure that there is adequate, accurate, and timely 
information available on the beneficial ownership? of all legal persons.150  The 
identity of the natural persons who ultimately have a controlling ownership 
interest in a legal person (e.g., corporation of some type) and the identity of the 
natural persons exercising control of the legal person through other means is 
the target of transparency requirements.151
In practical terms, ownership transparency can be achieved by the use of a 
central registry that collects, stores, and verifies the detailed information 
necessary to determine actual beneficial ownership of any and all types of 
entities, including trusts and foundations.152  Relevant information captured in 
a central registry would include such data as name, legal entity type, formation 
documents, related bylaws, address of a registered office or principal place of 
business or address of the entity itself, name and address of a registered agent, 
names and addresses of persons in position of legal control within the entity 
(e.g., directors, officers, and council members), and the name(s) of the 
beneficial owner(s).153
One huge obstacle to achievement of practical or actual transparency is that 
transparency of ownership requirements is vastly different from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.154  In the U.S. alone, where entity formation legal requirements are 
controlled by the states, vast differences make for more favorable entity 
formation and maintenance in some states than they do in others.  For example, 
in 2006, the General Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study and found 
that no state collected beneficial ownership information on corporations, only 
a few collected it on LLCs and other corporate-like entities, and only four states 
collected minimal information on LLCs.155  Less than half of states collected 
information about management, directors, and officers of corporations.156
Although most states collected information on corporate officers and LLC 
managers in periodic reports, the information in these reports was not verified, 
including that pertaining to beneficial ownership.157  This is still the situation 
150. FATF, supra note 5, at 12. 
151. Id.
152. Kalant, supra note 9, at 1054?55.  
153. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 71; Kalant, supra note 9, at 1055?
56. 
154. Anonymous, Corporate Ownership and Corruption: How to Crack a Shell, THE 
ECONOMIST, May 7, 2016, at 56. 
155. Martinez, supra note 56, at 194?95; GAO, supra note 49, at 4. 
156. GAO, supra note 49, at 16. 
157. Id. at 4.  
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today.158  Finally, the states do not screen information against criminal watch 
lists.  The FBI has open investigations that have not been resolved because 
beneficial owners are virtually untraceable.159
B. TCSPs and Gatekeepers 
The services of gatekeepers are often essential for tax evasion and other 
illegal schemes to succeed.  Gatekeepers sometimes facilitate the commission 
??? ?? ?????????? ????????? ????? ??? ??????????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ??
commercial transaction, commingling property and proceeds, or disguising 
property ownership/control by the ultimate beneficial owners.160 ?????????????
services help sever the connection between the illegal tax evasion schemer and 
the safe enjoyment of his or her interest-earning assets.161  They can also 
provide tax evaders ?a veneer of respectability.?162
Gatekeepers or TCSPs are lawyers, accountants, or businesses that create 
and provide administrative services for various types of entities, such as 
corporations, IBCs, LLCs, foundations, and trusts.  ?In some jurisdictions, 
[gatekeepers] are the only means for those who wish to establish certain kinds 
of legal vehicles, such as [an IBC].?163  In code or civil law countries, certain 
entities, such as foundations and IBCs, require a notarial deed for creation, 
meaning that notaries must be employed (i.e., hire a TCSP).164   
Indispensable administrative procedures performed by TCSPs include 
checking for the availability of an entity name, filing appropriate documents 
with the authorities, opening bank accounts, providing nominees (when 
necessary), acting as registered agents, paying fees, handling annual reporting 
obligations and mail forwarding, and providing virtual office facilities.165
Many gatekeepers furnish clients with entities from a wide range of different 
jurisdictions.166  Large TCSPs may form an entity for a client in one jurisdiction 
158. Martinez, supra note 56, at 194?95. 
159. Id. at 195. 
160. Stephen Baker & Ed Shorrock, Gatekeepers, Corporate Structures and their Role in Money 
Laundering, in INT?L CTR. FOR ASSET RECOVERY, BASEL INST. ON GOVERNANCE, TRACING STOLEN 
ASSETS: A PRACTITIONER?S HANDBOOK 81, 82 (2009).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 84; see also Baker & Shorrock, supra 
note 160, at 82?83.  
164. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 84. 
165. Id.; Baker & Shorrock, supra note 160, at 82?83. 
166. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 84; Baker & Shorrock, supra note 
160, at 82?83. 
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(e.g., Belize) but retain client data on file in a different jurisdiction.  This makes 
it more difficult for regulators and forensic accountants to access the 
information.167
TCSPs in many offshore jurisdictions have become subject to formal 
licensing and regulation, including being audited, meeting anti-money 
laundering standards, and applying suitability tests to directors.168  TCSPs in 
onshore jurisdictions, particularly states in the U.S., are more loosely 
regulated.169  This factor contributes to the large number of foreign persons 
creating LLCs and other entities in the U.S.  One of the most widely used U.S. 
incorporators is Wyoming Corporate Services, a shell/shelf incorporator in 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.170
In those cases where an attorney is the TCSP or works for the TCSP, the 
attorney?client privilege may erect another barrier to gleaning information by 
forensic accountants and investigators.171  The extent to which this barrier exists 
varies depending on the laws of the respective jurisdiction.   
C. Layering and Chaining of Shell Entities 
Tax perpetrators often use a layer or chain of entities established in different 
jurisdictions to maximize anonymity and make it almost impossible for forensic 
accountants and tax investigators to determine beneficial ownership.  In a 
layered or tiered legal structure, layers of legal entities are inserted between the 
individual beneficial owner(s) and the assets or funds of the shell entity that 
moves or holds legal title to those assets or funds.172  The layering or chaining 
of various legal entities across numerous jurisdictions (e.g., Jersey, Gibraltar, 
the U.S., and the BVI) facilitates access to the international financial or banking 
system in the names of different entities.173  Investigators and forensic 
accountants may, for example, obtain ownership information on an entity in 
Country A and discover that the legal owners of that entity are corporations or 
trusts registered in Countries B and C.  Offshore countries and entities by no 
means possess a monopoly on this type of arrangement.  Legal entities in such 
167. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 84; Baker & Shorrock, supra note 
160, at 82?83. 
168. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 85?86. 
169. Id. at 86. 
170. Kelly Carr & Brian Grow, Special Report: A Little House of Secrets on the Great Plains,
REUTERS (June 28, 2011, 6:40 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-shell-companies-
idUSTRE75R20Z20110628 [https://perma.cc/N6DX-MPPZ]. 
171. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 6.  
172. Id. at 52. 
173. Id.
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places as the U.S. and U.K. are also used frequently in layering arrangements.174
The ability to layer or pyramid within and across jurisdictions faces few, if any, 
restrictions.175
An example of the use of layered or chained entities for tax purposes 
occurred in United States v. Veksler.176 During 1991 and 1992, Richard 
McNaughton and Igor Veksler ?were involved in a scheme to evade federal and 
states taxes on sales of number two oil, a product that can be used as either 
home heating oil or diesel fuel.?177 ?During this period, no taxes were imposed 
by the federal government . . .[,] New Jersey or Pennsylvania on the sale of 
number two oil for use as home heating oil.?178 ???????United States, New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania did tax the sale of number two oil when it was . . . used 
as diesel fuel . . . .?179  The tax was imposed ?on the producer or importer who 
first sold the oil to a purchaser who did not hold a Registration for Tax-Free 
Transactions (IRS Form 637).?180
???? ???? ???????? ??????? ????????? ???? ???? ??? ?? ??????? ??????? ??? ??????
entities.181 ???????????????? is a string of [shell entities] controlled by a single 
person or group of persons.?182  In Veksler, ?No. 2 oil was transferred on paper 
from [firm to firm] through the daisy chain, first as home heating oil, but then 
as diesel fuel . . . to make it difficult to determine which entity was responsible 
for the payment of the taxes.?183  The first several shells in the chain would have 
an IRS Form 637 and would sell the oil as tax-exempt home heating oil.184  At 
some point, the oil would be sold as diesel fuel, but the taxes were never 
remitted to the federal and state governments to which they were owed.185
??T]he same company always made the first taxable sale.?186  This company 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
174. Id.
175. Id. at 53. 
176. 62 F.3d 544 (3d Cir. 1995). 
177. Id. at 547. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id.
181. Id. 
182. United States v. Veksler, 862 F.Supp. 1337, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id.
186. Id.
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owed.187  In this daisy chain operation, all of the transactions would occur on 
the same day.188  In many transactions, the oil never moved since ?the company 
that originally sold the oil as home heating oil also bought it back as diesel fuel 
at the end of the chain, then distributed it to retailers.?189  Other than the entities 
at the beginning and end, those in the daisy chain had no function other than 
the transfer of oil on paper to other entities in the scheme.190 ?These sham 
companies typically were run out of one-room offices which contained only a 
telephone, fax machine, and a desk.?191  These features match the classic 
characteristics of a shell entity, regardless of type of legal structure.   
Tax evaders trying to cloak their identity using shell entities create complex 
layered networks, which result in a labyrinth for forensic accountants and tax 
investigators.  TCSPs involved in providing these professional services are 
often of little help in investigations as they do not deal with beneficial owners 
personally.192  The TCSPs and other gatekeepers are often left untouched by 
authorities, even when a fraudster is caught and prosecuted in a shell entity 
scheme.193  The TCSPs and other gatekeepers will continue to capitalize on the 
needs of tax evaders for chained or layered entities, thereby making the vicious 
cycle of layered shell entities a never-ending game.   
IV. POLICY REACTIONS AND RESPONSES TO THE TAX EVASION AND 
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP ISSUES
A. U.S. Domestic 
Forensic accountants and tax enforcement officials have a very difficult 
time untangling the intricate shell entity networks created by tax evaders.  Not 
unaware of this issue, the U.S. government has attempted policy initiatives to 
improve ownership transparency of shell entities.   
In 2008, Senators Levin, Coleman, and Obama introduced legislation 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ???
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 1341. 
189. Id.
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Martinez, supra note 56, at 202; Lucy Komisar, Shells, Shams and Corporate Scams, THE 
AM. INTEREST (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.the-american-interest.com/2011/01/01/shells-shams-and-
corporate-scams [https://perma.cc/2YFR-5GN3]. 
193. Melanie Hicken & Blake Ellis, These U.S. Companies Hide Drug Dealers, Mobsters and 
Terrorists, CNN MONEY (Dec. 9, 2015, 4:36 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/09/news/shell-
companies-crime [https://perma.cc/3UJC-EDE5]. 
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[(ITLEA)]??194  The legislation has been reintroduced several times since 2008 
without being enacted into law.195 ????????????????????????????????????????
owners and formation agents who form non-publicly held companies in the 
??????? ??????? ????????? ???? ??????????? ??????? ??? ?????? ???????????196  First, 
ITLEA would place a significant burden on states and formation agents to 
collect and maintain a current list of all beneficial owners.197  Second, the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
beneficial owners.198  Third, for foreign-held entities in the United States, the 
bill requires that a formation agent certify the foreign application for 
incorporation in a U.S. state.199 Beneficial owners of foreign-held entities 
would have to provide a photocopy of the page of the passport on which the 
photo appears.200
The United States is slowly moving forward on the beneficial ownership 
issue. ?In June 2016, FinCEN finalized its long-outstanding beneficial 
ownership rule, which extends customer due diligence [(CDD)] 
requirements . . . to the natural persons behind a legal entity.?201  In June 2017, 
a bipartisan group of legislators introduced the Corporate Transparency Act, 
which would require FinCEN to collect information on the beneficial owner(s) 
of entities created in the United States if it has not been collected at the state 
level.202
A piece of legislation that became law in 2010 and does assist in the fight 
against U.S. tax evaders is the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA).203 ?FATCA looks at all types of entities to identify U.S?????????????
194. Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 2956, 110th Cong. 
§ 1 (2008). 
195. Tracey Samuelson, Cracking Down on Shell Companies: A Years-Long Debate,
MARKETPLACE (Apr. 7, 2016, 3:56 PM), https://www.marketplace.org/2016/04/07/world/shell-comps 
[https://perma.cc/LK6L-EKLX]. 
196. Kalant, supra note 9, at 1054. 
197. Id. at 1055. 
198. J.  W.  Verret, Terrorism Finance, Business Associations, and the “Incorporation 
Transparency Act”, 70 LA. L. REV. 857, 859 (2010). 
199. Kalant, supra note 9, at 1056?57. 
200. Id. at 1057.  
201. Sylwia Wolos, The Ultimate Beneficial Ownership Identification Requirement: Why It 
Matters to All of Us, ACAMS TODAY (Sept. 19, 2017), http://acamstoday.org/the-ultimate-beneficial-
ownership-requirement-why-it-matters-to-all-of-us [https://perma.cc/44K8-8ZKN].  
202. Id.
203. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471?1474, 6038D (2017) (created); 26 U.S.C. §§ 163, 643, 679, 871, 1291, 
1298, 4701, 6011, 6501, 6662, and 6677 (2017) (amended). 
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?fin??????????????????????????????????????????? outside the U??????????????204  The 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????do not refer simply to bankable 
assets or accounts with regulated financial institutions . . . .?205 They are 
defined broadly to include such things as equity interests in partnerships and 
corporations and beneficial interests in trusts.206  FATCA requires all non-U.S. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
person status, such as a US place of birth, and to report the assets and identities 
of such persons to the US Tre??????????????????207  FATCA intends to weed 
out U.S. persons who may be hiding as anonymous beneficiaries of corporate 
vehicles.208  FATCA also mandates that such persons self-report their non-U.S. 
financial assets (over $50,000) annually to the IRS on Form 8938.209  When 
launched, FATCA threatened to impose a 30% withholding tax on certain U.S. 
source payments for non-participating persons.210  The 30% tax was a necessary 
stick to gain the attention of other governments.211  When over one hundred 
countries entered into intergovernmental (bilateral) agreements with the United 
States and pledged to incorporate FATCA into their domestic laws, the banks 
and other regulated financial institutions became the de facto police 
implementing FATCA.212 The law has been implicated in record-breaking 
numbers of U.S. citizenship renunciations during the years 2012?2016.213
Legislation to repeal FATCA has been introduced in the U.S. Senate and House 
of Representatives, ???? ?????????????? ????????? ??????? ???????
unconstitutionality, especially its alleged breach of the 4th Amendment.214  A 
legal challenge against the constitutionality of FATCA was filed in federal 
204. Robert Levine, Aaron Schumacher & Shudan Zhou, FATCA and the Common Reporting 
Standard, J. INT?L. TAX?N, Mar. 2016, at 43, 44.  
205. Id.
206. 26 U.S.C. § 1471(d)(2). 
207. See id. 
208. Biedermann, supra note 51, at 82. 
209. Id. 
210. Levine, Schumacher & Zhou, supra note 204, at 45. 
211. Id.
212. Id. at 46.
213. Adam Taylor, A Potentially Historic Number of People Are Giving Up Their U.S. 
Citizenship, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp2017/02/10/a-potentially-historic-number-of-
people-are-giving-up-their-u-s-citizenship. 
214. Elizabeth Thompson, Deal That Sends Canadian Bank Records to IRS is ‘Illegal,’ Lawyer 
Tells U.S. Committee, CBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/fatca-
canada-u-s-taxation-1.4087644 [https://perma.cc/PC77-YG84]. 
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district court in Ohio, but the lawsuit was ultimately dismissed on standing 
grounds by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.215
V. OTHER NATIONS 
In 2013, the risks of hidden entity beneficial ownership and tax evasion 
reached the attention of high-level leaders at the G8 summit in Lough Erne, 
Northern Ireland.  The G8 countries ???????????????G8 Principles, a set of eight 
???????????? ??? ?? ?be????????? ?????????? ??????? ??????? to combat the abuse of 
entities via legal arrangements.216  One important outcome from this summit 
????????????????????????? ????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? (OECD) call for the adoption of a multilateral exchange of 
information on beneficial owners.217
The G8 and FATF recommendations both endeavor to facilitate the 
disclosure of data about the identities of beneficial owners. The FATF 
recommendations focus on financial institutions while the G8 principles place 
the responsibility on the entities themselves.218  The G8 principles do not 
specify the type of data that needs to be presented to countries reporting 
information on entity beneficial ownership.219  One limitation of the G8 
principles is that only eight nations are obligated to follow them.   
Inspired by FATCA, in early 2016 the G20 countries committed to move 
towards implementing an automatic exchange of information targeting tax 
215. Crawford ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
216. Lakhani, supra note 148, at 125; Biedermann, supra note 51, at 74.  The first G8 principle 
requires companies to know who owns and controls them and their beneficial ownership. 2013 LOUGH 
ERNE G8 LEADERS? COMMUNIQUÉ 23, (June 18, 2013), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/20
7771/Lough_Erne_2013_G8_Leaders_Communique.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF5S-9EDW]. The second
principle addresses the availability of ownership information to relevant authorities. Id.  This principle 
recommends that nations make entity data available in central registries. Id.  The third principle 
requires trustees to have and make available information on beneficiaries and settlors of trusts to law 
enforcement and other authorities. Id. The fourth principle centers on educating authorities on the 
weaknesses within their anti-money laundering prevention methods. Id. The fifth principle specifically 
states that the abuse of mechanisms, such as bearer shares and nominee shareholders and directors, 
should be prevented. Id.  The sixth principle suggests that states should adopt customer identification 
and verification obligations to make sure that beneficiaries are properly vetted. Id. at 24.  The seventh 
principle addresses enforcement mechanisms that states should use against firms and financial 
institutions that do not comply with their obligations. Id.  The eighth principle focuses on the need for 
international cooperation for information exchange between nations regarding the abuse of corporate 
vehicles. Id.  
217. 2013 LOUGH ERNE G8 LEADERS? COMMUNIQUÉ, supra note 216, at 6?7.
218. Levine, Schumacher & Zhou, supra note 204, at 46; Lakhani, supra note 148, at 134. 
219. See 2013 LOUGH ERNE G8 LEADERS? COMMUNIQUÉ, supra note 216, at 23?24. 
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evasion.220 ?The G20 embraced ?????????????????????????????????????????
automatic financial data exchange known as the Common Reporting Standard 
(CRS).?221 The CRS is FATCA with a global reach that seeks to obtain 
information about individuals and entities resident in CRS-signing 
jurisdictions, which is held outside their own countries of residence.222
As of June 2018, 102 countries have committed to the adoption of CRS.223
As of July 5, 2018, over 3200 bilateral exchange relationships have been 
activated with respect to ninety jurisdictions.224  The CRS consists of the 
following four salient parts: 
1. A model Competent Authority Agreement (CAA), 
providing the international legal framework for the automatic 
exchange of CRS information;225
2. The Common Reporting Standard;226
3. The Commentaries on the CAA and the CRS;227 and 
220. Guilherme B. Reis, Common Reporting Standard Explained, TR. & EST., May 2016, at 37, 
37. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Activated Exchange Relationships for CRS Information, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/ 
[https://perma.cc/9ZNY-QMVJ] (last visited Aug. 18, 2018).  
224. Id.
225. OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION 
IN TAX MATTERS 3 (2d ed. 2017), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/standard-for-automatic-
exchange-of-financial-account-information-in-tax-matters-second-edition_9789264267992-en#page5 
[https://perma.cc/VX7W-VTPF]; What is the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/technical-
assistance/aeoi/whatisthemultilateralcompetentauthorityagreement.htm [https://perma.cc/P4P6-
8W9B] (last visited Aug. 18, 2018). 
226. The OECD has released a manual entitled Model Mandatory Disclosure Rules for CRS 
Avoidance Arrangements and Opaque Offshore Structures (approved on March 8, 2018 by the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs) to assist nations who have committed to the adoption of the CRS. OECD, 
MODEL MANDATORY DISCLOSURE RULES FOR CRS AVOIDANCE ARRANGEMENTS AND OPAQUE 
OFFSHORE STRUCTURES (2018), http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/model-
mandatory-disclosure-rules-for-crs-avoidance-arrangements-and-opaque-offshore-structures.htm 
[https://perma.cc/R9XA-M6SZ].  The purpose of the model mandatory disclosure rules is to provide 
tax administrators with information on CRS Avoidance Arrangements and Opaque Offshore 
Arrangements and Opaque Offshore Structures. Id. at 3.  The mandatory disclosure rules do not affect 
???? ?????????????????????????? ?? ??????????????????? ??????????????? ?????????????? ???????????????????
under the CRS. Id.  The rules are information-gathering tools that seek to bolster the integrity of the 
CRS by deterring advisors and other intermediaries from promoting certain schemes. Id.; OECD, supra 
note 225, at 3.
227. OECD, supra note 225, at 3.  
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4. The CRS XML Schema User Guide.228
Despite the implementation and cooperation of participating CRS 
countries, information from academic studies, media leaks, and tax compliance 
authorities show that professional advisors and other intermediaries continue to 
design, market, or assist in the implementation of offshore structures and 
arrangements that can be used by non-compliant taxpayers to circumvent the 
correct reporting of relevant tax information.229
CRS is a mix of bilateral and multilateral regimes and hundreds of 
intergovernmental agreements among CRS signatories are already in place.230
FATCA is basically a bilateral regime whereby the United States enters into 
one of two types of IGAs with each of its partner countries and they exchange 
information bilaterally.231  Under CRS, the exchange of information is always 
bilateral among the signatories.  Each pair of signatories must notify each other 
before exchange of information begins.232 ?Each CRS signatory is free to 
modify the CAA and . . . implement CRS obligations under its own laws.?233
CRS does not involve a withholding tax like FATCA, since all signatories agree 
to incorporate CRS provisions into their domestic laws.234   
Similar to FATCA, CRS obligations depend ??????????????????????????????
and country of residence.  Entities include corporations, partnerships, trusts, 
and foundations that are classified as reporting or non-reporting financial 
institutions, passive non-financial entities (NFEs), or active NFEs.235  Financial 
institutions include banks, brokers, custodians, and investment funds.236
?Reporting financial institutions are subject to a comprehensive set of duties or 
obligations.?237  TCSPs are generally financial institutions for CRS purposes.238
228. Id.  The OECD and cooperating countries have developed a schema in extensible mark-up 
language (XML) that allows the reporting of information under the CRS in an IT-based and 
standardized manner. Common Reporting Standard (CRS) User Guide and Schema, OECD (2018),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/common-reporting-standard/schema-and-user-
guide/#d.en345315 [https://perma.cc/6UXK-P47H].  A schema is a data structure for holding and 
transmitting information electronically and in bulk. Id.
229. OECD, supra note 226, at 3. 
230. Levine, Schumacher & Zhou, supra note 204, at 44. 
231. Id.
232. For a detailed explanation concerning the exchange of information under CRS, see OECD, 
supra note 225, at 230?71. 
233. Levine, Schumacher & Zhou, supra note 204, at 45. 
234. Id. at 46. 
235. Reis, supra note 220, at 38. 
236. Id.
237. Id. 
238. Id.
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The way that CRS rules function demonstrates a clear policy focus on 
control, apart from ownership.239  CRS regulations blur the lines between 
controlling persons and beneficial owners.240  On the other hand, ?FATCA 
consistently seeks to identify U.S. ???????????????????al ownership in non-U.S. 
passive assets, the idea being that the tax liabilities are attached to income 
derived from ownership.?241  Despite this difference, FATCA and CRS share 
one stated policy goal: to fight tax evasion.   
In November 2016, the G20 nations published a set of principles for 
governments to facilitate identification of the beneficial owners of shell 
entities.242  The principles stopped short of recommending public access to 
registries of beneficial ownership.  In the European Union, the Fourth AML 
Directive requires member states to introduce registries of company beneficial 
owners.243  The U.K. beneficial ownership registry opened in April 2016, but 
excluded trusts.244  The U.K. has set precedent ?by creating ???????????????????
fully open register of beneficial ownership,? albeit only disclosing those 
beneficial owners that meet the 25% threshold.?245 ?Where [registries] did 
become available in other European countries, the quality of data  (often 
collected but not verified) was criticized by industry experts.?246  Beneficial 
ownership registries in the BVI and Cayman Islands went on stream in June 
2017 to comply with an agreement reached with the U.K. government.247  The 
Cayman Islands also just amended its penal code in December 2017 so that 
foreign tax evasion and equivalent tax crimes are reportable in the Cayman 
Islands.248  On July 1, 2017, a beneficial ownership registry commenced 
239. Levine, Schumacher & Zhou, supra note 204, at 48. 
240. Id.
241. Id.; 26 U.S.C. §§1471?1474, 6038D (2017) (created); 26 U.S.C. §§163, 643, 679, 871, 
1291, 1298, 4701, 6011, 6501, 6662, and 6677 (2017) (amended). 
242. Jamie Smyth & George Parker, G20 Leaders Back Drive to Unmask Shell Companies, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 16, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/25ae632e-6d60-11e4-8f96-00144feabdc0 
[https://perma.cc/4HNW-GA5Y]. 
243. Wolos, supra note 201. 
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245. Jenik Radon & Mahima Achuthan, Beneficial Ownership Disclosure: The Cure for the 
Panama Paper Ills, 70 J. INT?L. AFF. 87, 87 (2017), https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/beneficial-ownership-
disclosure-%C2%A0cure%C2%A0-panama-papers-ills%C2%A0 [https://perma.cc/MQ2R-G9NM]. 
246. Wolos, supra note 201. 
247. Virgin Islands (British)/Cayman Islands Economy: Quick View-Beneficial Ownership 
Registries Go Live, VIEWSWIRE (July 10, 2017), 
http://search.eiu.com/Default.aspx?sText=virgin+islands+528british%29%2F+cayman+islands+econ
omy. 
248. Martin Livingston, Tim Dawson, Adam Huckle, Anthony Webster & Tom Katsaros, 
Further Important Changes to the Cayman Islands AML Regime, MAPLES (Feb. 5, 2018),
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operation in Guernsey.249  Access is restricted to the economic crime division 
of law enforcement and certain other persons in Guernsey government.250
In December 2017, an agreement was reached between the European 
Parliament and the EU Council on the latest amendments to the Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive (AMLD 5).251  The amendments attempt to prevent the 
use of the financial system for funding white-collar crime such as tax evasion.252
The following measures will be introduced in EU member states: 
? Registers of beneficial owners of firms will be made 
publicly accessible and national registries will be 
better interconnected;253
? Registers of beneficial owners of trusts and similar 
legal arrangements will only be publicly accessible 
where there is legitimate need;254
? Information on national banks and safe deposit boxes 
will be registered as well as data on real estate 
ownership (only to public authorities);255
? The 5th AMLD introduces a requirement for member 
states to verify beneficial ownership information 
submitted to their registries;256 and 
? EU bank customers who send funds internationally 
must provide personal data so it can be transmitted to 
all banks in the payment chain.257
http://maplesandcalder.com/news/article/further-important-changes-to-the-cayman-islands-aml-
regime-1647 [https://perma.cc/SA84-AD58]. 
249. Alan Bougourd, Presentation at the ICSA: Beneficial Ownership Register (Apr. 16, 2017) 
(presentation  slides  available  at  http://www.guernseyregistry.com/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=107438
&p=0 [https://perma.cc/F8YZ-VZF9]).  
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2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KHY6-Z4FY].  
257. ?????? ?????????? EU Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive: Can Banks Handle It?,
KYC360 (Nov. 21, 2017), https://kyc360.com/article/eu-fifth-anti-money-laundering-directive-key-
points-banks [https://perma.cc/L245-2WKU]. 
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The potential implementation of the 5th AMDL requirements remains to be 
seen since few member states took up the 4th AMDL option of implementing 
publicly accessible central registries of corporate beneficial owners.258
Beneficial ownership disclosure by itself is not the complete answer to tax 
evasion and lost revenues issues.  Such disclosure is most effective when 
accompanied by well-drafted criminal tax laws, sustained enforcement, modern 
technology, and sustained political will.259
VI. CONCLUSION     
Tax evaders and others form and use various types of domestic and 
offshore legal shell entities to conceal their identities as beneficial owners of 
assets, funds, and the earnings therefrom.  A beneficial owner is a natural 
person who controls and enjoys an asset, its benefits, or both.  Shell entities 
often have no significant assets or ongoing business activity.  The vulnerability 
of shell entities to tax evaders is amplified when they are privately rather than 
publicly owned.  The extensive abuse of domestic and offshore shell entities to 
conceal and transfer assets and commit tax fraud make them an important 
aspect of the work of forensic accountants and tax law enforcement.   
Trillions of dollars are located in secrecy jurisdictions around the globe.260
The traditional stereotypes of financial secrecy and tax havens are mostly 
inaccurate.  The locations that provide the most secrecy are Switzerland, the 
United States, Cayman Islands, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Hong Kong, and certain other nations?not small, tropical islands.261
White-collar criminals use various shell entities to commit tax evasion on 
a grand scale.  Such criminals may choose from a list of different types of legal 
structures.  These various structures include LLCs, shelf corporations, LLPs, 
FLPs, IBCs, asset protection trusts, private interest foundations, and company 
foundations.  Each entity type has its own unique structure and legal 
characteristics.  Nominees, nominee directors, and bearer shares are legal 
devices used in combination with shell entities to optimize evasion and 
concealment.   
Three principal reasons explain the ability of tax evaders and others to 
continue to hide their identities as beneficial owners and operators.  One reason 
is a legal framework in many jurisdictions that promotes lack of ownership 
transparency.  Another reason is that those who abuse shell entities need the 
services of gatekeepers such as accountants, lawyers, and TCSPs.  A third 
258. Id. 
259. Radon & Achuthan, supra note 245. 
260. Financial Secrecy Index, supra note 31.  
261. Id.
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reason is the layering or chaining of numerous shell entities in different 
jurisdictions that make it virtually impossible for forensic accountants and tax 
authorities to discern the real identity of beneficial owners.   
Various global organizations, such as the FATF, OECD, and groups of 
countries, such as the G8 and G20, have started to cooperate in dealing with the 
issue of hidden entity beneficial ownership and exchange of tax-related 
information.262  Improved information exchange is one of the means being used 
to combat concealed beneficial ownership and tax evasion.263  The creation of 
ownership registries is another goal of G8, G20, the FATF, and the OECD that 
is starting to receive attention and some government action.264  The use of 
ownership registries is complicated by numerous issues such as privacy 
infringement, placing excessive burdens on financial institutions, infringing on 
national sovereignty, bank secrecy, violation of contractual relationships, and 
others.  Global efforts on improving tax-related information exchange and 
entity ownership transparency are moving ahead at a modest pace.   
262. See FATF, supra note 5, at 12; Reis, supra note 220, at 37; 2013 LOUGH ERNE G8
LEADERS? COMMUNIQUÉ, supra note 216, at 6?8.
263. VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 77. 
264. Smyth & Parker, supra note 242; FATF, supra note 5, at 13; OECD, supra note 225, at 
136?38. 
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APPENDIX A
An Overview of Entity Vehicles in Selected Jurisdictions: Companies*
Country 
Information provided 
when registered (?
=provided) 
Is there a 
residency 
requirement? 
Bearer shares 
permitted? 
Corporate
directors 
permitted? 
Nominee 
directors 
permitted? 
Foreign 
companies 
registered? References 
Anguilla 
Physical Address 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Companies Act 
2000, §§1, 5(1), 7, 
28(5), 99, 188 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Physical Address 
Yes No No Yes Yes 
Companies Act 
1995, §§4, 29(2), 
62(2), 69, 99, 176, 
340 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
The 
Bahamas 
Physical Address 
No
No (Warrants 
permitted) Yes Yes Yes 
Companies Act 
1992, §§3, 6, 48, 
118; Business 
Licenses Act 1980; 
International 
Business Companies 
Act 2000, §§181, 
184, 185 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Belize 
Physical Address 
No
Immobilized 
(Warrants 
permitted) Yes Yes Yes 
Regulations of June 
2001; Companies 
Act, §§5, 38, 251 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
* VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 220?31.
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Bermuda 
Physical Address 
60% local 
ownership, 
unless 
declared an 
Exempt 
Company No No Yes Yes 
Companies Act 
(CA) 1981, §§6, 53, 
62(1-2), 91,(1-2), 
98, 133; CA 
Amendment 2009, 
3rd Schedule, Part I 
(§114) 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
(BVI) 
Physical Address 
No Immobilized Yes Yes Yes 
Business Companies 
Act (BCA) 2004, 
§§5, 9; BCA 
Amendment 2005, 
§§2, 55, 67-77,132; 
International BCA 
2000, §§185, 186 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Cayman 
Islands 
Physical Address 
No Immobilized Yes Yes Yes 
Companies Law 
(CL) (2009 
Revision), §§26, 
163, 179, 229(1), 
230 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Cook Islands 
Physical Address 
No
Immobilized 
(Warrants 
permitted) Yes No Yes 
International 
Companies Act 
(ICA) 1981-82, 
§§13, 35(1), 36, 83, 
91, 201, 226A; ICA 
Amendment 2003, 
No. 5, §35A 
Registered office 
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers ?
Cyprus 
Physical Address 
To be 
resident, 
company 
must be 
managed in 
Cyprus (not 
just 
incorporated) 
No (Warrants 
permitted) Yes Yes 
Yes; 
however, 
requires 
permit of 
the Central 
Bank of 
Cyprus 
Companies Law, 
Ch. 113, §§14, 75, 
81, 102, 192, 197, 
347; Cyprus Income 
Tax Law, No. N118 
(I), 2002 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers ?
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Czech 
Republic 
Physical Address 
No
Dematerialized 
(Warrants 
Permitted) No Yes Yes 
Commercial Code 
(Act No. 513/1991 
Coll.), §§24, 28, 62, 
156, 175, 184(5), 
194(5,7), 217a 
Registered office 
Registered agent 
Managers/directors?
Legal owners ?
Officers ?
Delaware, 
United States 
Physical Address 
No No No Yes Yes 
Delaware Code, 
Title 8, Ch. 1, §§ 
101, 132, 141(a), 
145, 158, 371 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors
Legal owners 
Officers 
Dubai, 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Physical Address 
No No No Yes Yes 
Companies Law 
2009, DIFC Law 
No. 2 of 2009, Art. 
11, 38, 51, 115 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors?
Legal owners 
Officers 
Florida, 
United States 
Physical Address ?
No No No Yes Yes 
Florida Business 
Corp. Act. §607 
(203, 723, 802, 850, 
1401, 1501, 1503); 
OECD Tax Co-
operation 2009, 
"Towards a Level 
Playing Field," 
p.122 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors?
Legal owners 
Officers ?
Gibraltar 
Physical Address 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Companies 
Ordinance, §§14, 
15, 63, 136, 289 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors?
Legal owners 
Officers 
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Guernsey 
Physical Address 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Companies 
(Guernsey) Law 
2008 §§14, 15, 17, 
75, 77(e), 132, 143; 
Bailiwick of 
Guernsey Law 2000 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
Hong Kong 
SAR, China 
Physical Address 
Company 
secretary 
must be 
resident 
No (Warrants 
permitted) Yes Yes Yes 
Hong Kong 
Companies 
Ordinance, §§14, 
73, 153(B), 154, 
333 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners ?
Officers ?
Isle of Man 
(1) 
Physical Address 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Companies Act 
1931, §§5, 12, 64, 
312 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Isle of Man 
(2) New 
Manx
Vehicle 
(NMV)
Physical Address 
No No
Yes (must 
be licensed) Yes Yes 
Companies Act 
2006, §§5, 2, 30, 74, 
91, 112, 162 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Jersey 
Physical Address 
No No
No (note 
that there 
are some 
limitations) Yes 
Information 
Unavailable 
Companies (Jersey) 
Law 1991, Art. 3, 7, 
42, 73, 77 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
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Liechtenstein
Physical Address 
1 board 
member must 
be a citizen 
of an EEA 
state and 
have a 
permanent 
office in 
Liechtenstein 
Yes (note that 
there are some 
limitations) Yes Yes 
Information 
Unavailable 
Personen- und 
Gesellschaftsrecht, 
Art. 180, 279, 291, 
263; Ordinance of 
11 Jan 2005 on Due 
Diligence Act, Art. 
3; OECD Tax Co-
operation 2009, 
"Towards a Level 
Playing Field," p. 
214 
Registered office 
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
Luxembourg 
Physical Address 
No
Yes (AML 
rules require 
ID of 
beneficial 
owner) Yes Yes Yes 
Loi concernant les 
Sociétés 
Commerciales 27, 
(10 August 1915), 
Art. 11, 27, 51; 
OECD Tax Co-
operation 2009, 
"Towards a Level 
Playing Field," 
p.221, fn.3 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
Mauritius 
Physical Address 
No No No Yes Yes 
Companies Act 
2001, §§23, 49, 88, 
131, 133, 161, 276 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners ?
Officers 
Netherlands 
Antilles 
Physical Address ?
One resident 
managing 
director 
Yes (note that 
there are some 
limitations) Yes Yes 
Information 
Unavailable 
Netherlands Antilles 
Commercial Code, 
Art. 33-155; Civil 
Code, Art. 19; 
National Decree of 
Dec. 22, 2009, 
implementation of 
Art. 20 of the Trade 
Register Ordinance 
(2009 Trade 
Register Decree), 
Art. 15 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers ?
Nevada, 
United States
Physical Address 
No No No  Yes 
Information 
Unavailable 
Nevada Revised 
Statutes, §§78.030, 
78.035, 78.235(1), 
78.115, 77.310 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
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Nevis 
Physical Address 
No Immobilized 
Yes 
(Corporate 
directors 
must have 
individuals 
as
directors) Yes Yes 
Nevis Business 
Corporations 
Ordinance 1999, 
§25; Companies Act 
1996 (No. 22 of 
1996), §§4, 51, 72, 
73, 195 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Ontario, 
Canada 
Physical Address 
No Dematerialized No Yes 
Information 
Unavailable 
Business 
Corporations Act, 
§§5, 14, 100, 118, 
119, 136; Securities 
Transfer Act 2006 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
Panama  
Physical Address 
No
Yes (note that 
there are some 
limitations) No Yes Yes 
Commercial Code 
Decree-Law No. 32 
of 1927, Decree-
Law No. 5 of 1997, 
Articles 1, 2, 6, 28, 
49, 90 
Registered office 
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
Seychelles 
Physical Address 
No No No Yes Yes 
Companies 
Ordinance 1972, 
§§3, 10, 21, 100, 
164, 310 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Singapore 
Physical Address ?
At least one 
director must 
be ordinarily 
resident No No Yes Yes 
Companies Act, 
Ch. 50, §§19, 66, 
126, 145, 171, 172, 
367; Business 
Registration Act, 
Ch. 32 §6 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers ?
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South Africa 
(1) Company
Physical Address 
No No
Yes (note 
that there 
are some 
limitations) Yes Yes 
Companies Act 
2008, §§14, 19, 23, 
50, 51, 56, 66, 69, 
78
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
St. Kitts 
Physical Address 
No Immobilized 
Yes (must 
have 
individuals 
as
directors) Yes Yes 
Companies Act 
1996 (No. 22 of 
1996), §§4, 8, 51, 
72, 73, 195 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers ?
St. Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 
Physical Address 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
The Companies Act, 
No. 8 of 1994, §§4, 
9, 29, 62, 69, 176, 
340 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
Switzerland 
Physical Address ?
Directors 
may be 
foreigners 
residing 
abroad. 
Someone 
who can sign 
for the 
company (not 
necessarily a 
director) 
must be 
resident Yes No
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Code of 
Obligations, 
Ordinanza sul 
registro di 
commercio del 17 
ottobre 2007 (Stato 
1° gennaio 2008), 
Art. 66-68; OECD 
Tax Co-operation 
2009, "Towards a 
Level Playing 
Field," (2009), p. 
221, fn. 3 
Registered office 
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Turks and 
Caicos 
Physical Address ?
No Immobilized Yes Yes Yes 
Turks and Caicos, 
Companies 
Ordinance (CO) 
1998, Ch. 122, §§4, 
32, 208; CO 
(Amendment), 
2001; Business 
Names Ordinance, 
(5); CO 1981 (as 
amended), (6) 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
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United
Kingdom 
Physical Address 
No Yes 
Yes (at 
least one 
director 
must be an 
individual) Yes 
Information 
Unavailable 
Companies Act 
2006, Parts 2, 9, 12, 
21 (783, 779), Part 
10 (155, 232); 
OECD Tax Co-
operation 2009, 
"Towards a Level 
Playing Field," 
(2009), p. 221, fn. 3 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers ?
Uruguay 
Physical Address ?
No Dematerialized 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Ley N° 16.060 
Sociedades 
Comerciales, art. 
13; Ley N° 17.904, 
art. 13, 16; OECD 
Tax Co-operation 
2009, "Towards a 
Level Playing 
Field," (2009), p. 
221 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers ?
Wyoming, 
United States
Physical Address 
No No No Yes Yes 
Wyoming Business 
Corporation Act, 
§17-16-201, -202, -
625, -723, -802, -
803, -851, -1801;
§17-17-102 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
APPENDIX B
An Overview of Entity Vehicles in Selected Jurisdictions: Exempt International Business 
Companies*
Country 
Information provided 
when registered (?
=provided) 
Is there a 
residency 
requirement? 
Local 
business 
permitted? 
Bearer shares 
permitted? 
Bearer 
share 
warrants 
permitted? 
Corporate
directors 
permitted? 
Nominee 
directors 
permitted? References 
Anguilla 
Physical Address 
No No Immobilized Yes Yes Yes 
Custody of 
Bearer Shares 
Regulations, 
Revised 
Regulations of 
Anguilla: I20-
3, §§2-3; 
International 
Business
Companies 
Act 2000, §§7, 
16(1)(a & g), 
39, 56 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
* VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 232?38.
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Antigua 
and 
Barbuda 
Physical Address ?
No No Dematerialized Yes Yes Yes 
International 
Business
Corporations
Act, §§5, 61, 
97, 111(5), 
130(2);
Companies 
Act, §344; 
Corporate
Management 
and Service 
Providers 
Act 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
The 
Bahamas 
Physical Address 
No
Must be 
licensed No
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable Yes 
International 
Business
Companies 
Act 2000, 
§§4, 10, 13, 
40, 58, 187; 
Business
Licenses Act 
1980
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Belize 
Physical Address 
No
Information 
Unavailable 
Yes (must be 
kept with local 
trust and 
company 
service 
provider) Yes Yes Yes 
International 
Business
Companies 
Act 1990, as 
amended in 
2000, §§3, 9, 
12, 47, 63; 
Regulations 
of June 2001 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Bermuda 
Physical Address 
At least 2 
directors, or 
secretary and 
director, or a 
secretary and 
a resident 
representative 
Must be 
licensed 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Companies 
Act 1981, 
§§129, 130 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Cayman 
Islands 
Physical Address 
No No No No Yes Yes 
Companies 
Law (2009 
Revision), 
§§26, 163, 
179, 229(1), 
230;
Companies 
Law (2009 
Revision) 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
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Mauritius 
(2) Global 
business 
company 
category 1 
(GBC1) 
Physical Address 
At least two 
directors 
must be a 
resident 
individual; 
Shareholders 
must be 
nonresident 
May 
conduct 
specified 
activities 
within 
Mauritius 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Financial 
Services Act 
2007, as 
described in 
Circular 
Letter 
(CL201207) 
of 21 
December 
2007 entitled 
"New 
Conceptal 
Approach to 
Global 
Business"; 
Companies 
Act, §23 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors?
Legal owners ?
Officers 
Mauritius 
(3) Global 
business 
company 
category 2 
(GBC2) 
Physical Address 
At least one 
director 
must be a 
resident; 
Shareholders 
must be 
nonresident No
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Financial 
Services Act 
2007, as 
described in 
Circular 
Letter 
(CL201207) 
of 21 
December 
2007 entitled 
"New 
Conceptal
Approach to 
Global 
Business"; 
Companies 
Act, §23 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors?
Legal owners ?
Officers 
Nevis 
Physical Address 
No No Immobilized Yes Yes Yes 
Nevis 
Business 
Corporations 
Ordinance 
1984, §§21, 
31, 56, 123 
Registered office 
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors
Legal owners 
Officers 
Seychelles 
Physical Address 
No No No No Yes Yes 
International 
Business 
Companies 
Act 1994, 
§§5, 12, 41, 
56, 82 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors
Legal owners 
Officers 
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St. Kitts 
Physical Address 
No
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Companies 
Act 1996 (No. 
22 of 1996), 
§§195, 206 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers ?
St. Lucia 
Physical Address 
No No No No Yes Yes 
International 
Business 
Companies 
Act 1999, §§4, 
7, 28, 42, 57 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
St. Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines
Physical Address 
No No Immobilized Yes Yes Yes 
International 
Business 
Companies 
(Amendment 
and 
Consolidation) 
Act 2007, 
§§4-7, 11, 14, 
29, 30, 84 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Turks and 
Caicos 
Physical Address ?
No No Immobilized 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Companies 
Ordinance 
(CO) 1998, 
Ch. 122. §§4, 
32, 180, 192, 
208; CO 
(Amendment) 
2001;
Business 
Names 
(Registration) 
Ordinance, §5 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
2018] SHELL ENTITIES AND LACK OF OWNERSHIP TRANSPARENCY 155 
APPENDIX C
An Overview of Entity Vehicles in Selected Jurisdictions: Limited Liability Companies*
Country 
Information provided 
when registered (?
=provided) 
Is there a 
residency 
requirement? 
Corporate
members 
permitted? 
Nominee 
members 
permitted? References 
Anguilla 
Physical Address 
No Yes 
Information 
Unavailable 
Limited Liability Company Act, 
§§11, 28 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Physical Address 
No Yes Yes 
Antigua and Barbuda International 
Limited Liability Companies Act 
2007, §§12, 17 
Registered office 
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Cook Islands 
Physical Address 
No No Yes 
Limited Liability Companies Act 
2008, §§11, 12, 26 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Czech 
Republic 
Physical Address 
No No
No, but one 
individual 
may not be a 
member of 
more than 3 
LLCs 
Commercial Code (Act. No. 
513/1991 Coll.), §§24, 28, 62, 105 
Registered office 
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners ?
Officers ?
* VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 239?44.
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Delaware, 
United States 
Physical Address 
No No Yes 
Delaware Code, Title 6, Ch. 18, §§ 
18-301, 18-902.; Certificate of 
formation must be filed with 
Secretary of State; foreign LLC 
must be registered; LLC Act, Ch.II, 
s. 18-201(a)(2) 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Dubai, United 
Arab Emirates 
Physical Address 
No No Yes 
Companies Law 2009, DIFC Law 
No. 2 of 2009, Art. 11 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
Florida, United 
States 
Physical Address ?
No Yes Yes 
Florida Limited Liability Company 
Act, §§608.407(1), 608.409, 
608.501 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Isle of Man 
Physical Address 
No Yes Yes 
Limited Liability Companies Act 
1996, §§4-7 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners ?
Officers 
Luxembourg 
Physical Address 
No
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Loi concernant les Sociétés 
Commerciales 27, (10 August 
1915), §§11bis 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
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Nevada, 
United States 
Physical Address 
No Yes  Yes Nevada Revised Statutes, §§77, 86 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
Nevis 
Physical Address 
No Yes Yes 
Nevis Limited Liability Company 
Ordinance 1995, §§21, 26, 37, 47, 
83
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Panama  
Physical Address 
No Yes Yes 
Law No. 4 of 2009 (Replaced Law 
No. 24 of 1966), Art. 5, 38 
Registered office 
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners ?
Officers ?
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
Physical Address 
No Yes Yes 
Limited Liability Companies Act 
2008, §§12, 34, 76 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
Switzerland 
Physical Address ?
Yes (note that 
there are some 
limitations) 
Information 
Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable 
Art. 814 Code of Obligations; 
Ordinanza sul registro di 
commercio del 17 ottobre 2007 
(Stato 1° gennaio 2008), Art. 73 
Registered office ?
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners ?
Officers 
158 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:111 
Turks and 
Caicos 
Physical Address 
No Yes Yes 
Turks and Caicos, Companies 
Ordinance 1998 
Registered office ?
Registered agent 
Managers/directors 
Legal owners 
Officers 
Wyoming, 
United States 
Physical Address 
No Yes Yes 
Wyoming Limited Liability 
Company Act, §§17-15-106; 17-15-
107 
Registered office 
Registered agent ?
Managers/directors ?
Legal owners 
Officers 
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APPENDIX D
An Overview of Entity Vehicles in Selected Jurisdictions: Trusts*
Country 
Entity 
registered? 
Is there a residency 
requirement? 
Flee clauses 
prohibited? 
Settlor can be other 
parties in the trust?  References 
Anguilla Optional 
Where beneficiary is 
resident, and no trustee is 
resident, beneficiary may 
apply for resident trustee 
to be appointed No
Settlor may be the 
trustee, beneficiary, or 
protector Trusts Act 2000, §§8, 66 
The 
Bahamas No No No
Settlor may be 
beneficiary, cotrustee, 
or protector 
Trustee Act 1998, §§3, 94; 
Registration of Records 
Act, Ch. 187 
* VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., supra note 8, at 252?59.
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Belize Optional No No
Settlor may be the 
trustee, beneficiary, or 
protector 
Trusts Act 2000, §§ 4 (3-
6), 9, 13, 20, 63 
Bermuda No No No
Settlor may retain 
certain rights and 
powers, trustee may be 
beneficiary 
Trusts (Special Provisions) 
Act 1989, §§2, 12 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
(BVI) (2) No
At least one trustee must 
be a BVI Trust and 
Company Service Provider 
Not allowed 
following 
court order, 
criminal 
proceedings, 
or
investigations 
Settlor may be 
beneficiary, cotrustee, or 
protector 
Trustee (Amendment) Act 
2003, §11; BVI Trustee 
Act 1961, §§2, 81, 86 
BVI (2) -
Virgin 
Islands 
Special Trust 
(VISTA) No
Trust deed must provide 
appointment of enforcer 
and at least one trustee 
must be a "designated 
person" (essentially a BVI 
licensed trustee) No
No restrictions on 
settlor's role 
Virgin Islands Special 
Trusts Act 2003 
Cayman 
Islands No No No
Settlor may be 
beneficiary, cotrustee, or 
protector 
Trusts Law (2009 
Revision), §§13, 14, 89; 
Tasarruf Meduati Fonu v. 
Merrill Lynch Bank and 
Trust Company (Cayman) 
Ltd of 9 Sept 2009, 
provided confirmation that 
"reserved powers" 
legislation is upheld in its 
home jurisdictions 
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Cyprus No
Either the settlor or any of 
the beneficiaries is a 
Cypriot 
Information 
Unavailable Information Unavailable 
Companies Law, Ch. 113, 
§112; Cyprus Trustees 
Law, Ch. 193 
Delaware, 
United States 
(1) Common 
Law Trust No No
Information 
Unavailable 
Settlor can create an 
irrevocable trust, where 
the settlor is a 
beneficiary, while 
retaining various 
interests in, and powers 
over, the trust 
Delaware Code, Title 12, 
Ch. 35, §3556; Qualified 
Dispositions in Trust Act, 
12 Del. C. §3570 et seq. 
(1997) 
Delaware, 
United States 
(2) Statutory 
Trust 
Certificate of 
Trust must be 
filed with 
Secretary of 
State 
One trustee must be a 
resident of Delaware No
Settlor may be 
beneficiary; any person 
may be manager of trust 
Delaware Code, Title 12, 
Ch. 38, §§3801, 3802, 
3806-7, 3807, 3852 
Dubai, 
United Arab 
Emirates No No No
No restrictions on 
settlor's role 
DICF Trust Law of 2005, 
Articles 23, 24, 29, 68 
Florida, 
United States No No No
No restrictions on 
settlor's role 
Florida Trust Code 
§§736.0401, 736.0409 
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Gibraltar 
No, unless 
settlor wants to 
use special 
asset protection 
under
bankruptcy 
ordinance No No
No restrictions on 
settlor's role 
Registered Trust Act, §§3, 
8; Trustee Act of 
Gibraltar; the Registered 
Trust Ordinance 1999 
Guernsey No No No
Settlor may revoke or 
amend the terms of a 
trust; give trustees 
directions in relation to 
investments or remove a 
trustee, beneficiary, or 
enforcer; settlor or 
trustee of a trust may 
also be a beneficiary 
The Trusts (Guernsey) 
Law 2007, §§8, 15(1), 38 
Hong Kong 
SAR, China 
No, but any 
interest in land, 
which is in 
writing, must 
be registered 
with the Land 
Registry No No
No restrictions on 
settlor's role 
Hong Kong Trustee 
Ordinance, Ch. 29; 
Recognition of Trusts 
Ordinance, Ch. 76 
Isle of Man 
(1) No No No
No restrictions on 
settlor's role 
Recognition of Trusts Act 
1988; In Re 
Heginbotham's Petition 
1999 
Isle of Man 
(2) Purpose 
Trust No
Must use at least one Isle 
of Man trustee No Information Unavailable Purpose Trusts Act 1996 
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Jersey No No No
Settlors may maintain 
control and a beneficial 
interest in the trust 
Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984, 
Articles 7, 9, 12 
Liechtenstein 
(1) - Private 
Trust
Yes; if created 
for longer than 
12 months 
must be 
registered in 
the Public 
Register 
At least one trustee must 
be an European Economic 
Area (EEA) Member State 
Trust and Company 
Service Provider No
Beneficiary may be 
trustee, but not if sole 
beneficiary; settlor may 
be beneficiary, but not if 
sole beneficiary 
Law on Persons and 
Companies (PGR), LGBI 
4/1/1926, Art. 897-932, 
900, 902; Law onf Trust 
Enterprises, LGBI 6/1928, 
PGR Art. 932a 
Liechtenstein 
(2) - Trust 
Enterprise Yes 
One of the trustees must be 
a Liechtenstein Trust and 
Company Service Provider No
Settlor may reserve 
rights in the trust 
instrument 
Law on Persons and 
Companies (PGR), Art. 
932a, §§1, 7, 49 
Mauritius No
Must have local Trust and 
Company Service Provider 
serving as a trustee; 
nonresident settlors and 
beneficiaries may apply for 
GBC1 and GBC2 license No
Settlor may also be a 
trustee, a beneficiary, a 
protector, or an 
enforcer, but shall not 
be the sole beneficiary 
of a trust of which 
he/she is a settlor 
Trusts Act 2001, §§4, 8, 
19, 23, 27; Registration 
Duty Act, 1982 and the 
Transcription and 
Registration Act 1982 
Nevada, 
United States 
Business trusts 
must be filed 
with Secretary 
of State No No
Settlor may maintain 
power to amend trust 
Nevada Revised Statutes, 
Ch. 88 (Business Trusts); 
Nevada Revised Statutes, 
§63.160 
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Nevis 
All 
International 
Trusts and 
qualified 
foreign Trusts 
must be 
registered with 
the Registrar of 
International 
Trusts No No
Settlor may be the 
trustee, beneficiary, or 
protector 
International Exempt Trust 
Ordinance 1994, §§9, 37, 
47
Ontario, 
Canada No No No
No restrictions on 
settlor's role Trustee Act 
Panama  
No, only trusts 
holding 
property in 
Panama must 
be registered 
Agent must be Panamanian 
lawyer No
Settlor can be a 
beneficiary of the trust 
but cannot administer 
any of its assets; settlor 
cannot be the trustee Law No. 1 of 1984 
Seychelles 
Must file a 
brief 
declaration by 
the licensed 
resident trustee 
with the 
Government 
Registry 
Settlor may not be a 
Seychelles resident (under 
international trust)  No
Settlor may be the 
enforcer; can also be a 
beneficiary under the 
international trust (but 
not a sole beneficiary) 
International Trust Act 
1994, §§4, 13, 14, 17, 75, 
76
Singapore 
(foreign 
trust) No
Every settlor and 
beneficiary must be either 
(a) individuals who are 
neither citizens nor 
residents of Singapore or 
(b) foreign companies, 
including unit trusts 
beneficially owned wholly 
by such individuals or 
foreign companies No
Trustee may delegate 
power to settlor (not to 
beneficiaries) 
The Trustees 
(Amendment) Act 2004 
and The Trust Companies 
Act 2005 
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South Africa Yes No No Information Unavailable 
Trust Property Control Act 
57 of 1988, §4 
St. Kitts Yes 
One trustee must be 
resident No
Settlor may retain 
control; settlor or 
beneficiary may be 
protector 
Trusts Act 1996, §§4, 19, 
25, 95 
St. Lucia 
(International 
Trust) 
No, but if 
registered must 
be by a local 
Trust and 
Company 
Service 
Provider No No
Settlor may retain 
control and be a 
beneficiary 
International Trusts Act 
1999, §§3, 7, 9, 19, 22 
St. Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 
(International 
Trust) Optional 
Neither the settlor nor any 
beneficiary may be 
resident No
Settlor is permitted to 
retain substantive 
control or have "reserve 
powers" over the trust; 
settlor may be 
beneficiary or the sole 
beneficiary; settlor may 
not be trustee; settlor 
may be protector 
The Companies Act, No. 8 
of 1994, §186; The 
International Trust Act 
1996, §§9, 12, 36, 52 
Switzerland 
Information 
Unavailable Information Unavailable 
Information 
Unavailable Information Unavailable 
Ratified the Hague 
Convention the 
international recognition 
of trusts; as financial 
intermediaries, trustees 
have the obligation to 
obtain an authorization 
from the Federal Money 
Laundering Control 
Authority or to be 
affiliated to a SRO (self-
regulatory organization) 
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Turks and 
Caicos No No No No
The Trusts Ordinance 
1998, Ch. 124, Paras. 3, 7, 
9, 12 
United
Kingdom 
Not registered 
unless charity No No No
Trusts of Land and 
Appointment of Trustees 
Act 1996; Trustee Act 
2000 
Uruguay 
If holding land, 
must be 
registered No No
Settlor can also be the 
beneficiary of the trust 
Uruguayan Trust Law, 
§17.703 
Wyoming, 
United States 
No (only 
statutory trust 
must be 
registered) 
Trustee may not be settlor 
and must be resident of 
Wyoming No
Settlor retains power to 
add or remove trustees 
and to amend trust 
Wyoming Uniform Trust 
Code, §§4-10-401, -403, -
103, -510, -602 
